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Abstract— The actions of an autonomous vehicle on the road
affect and are affected by those of other drivers, whether
overtaking, negotiating a merge, or avoiding an accident. This
mutual dependence, best captured by dynamic game theory,
creates a strong coupling between the vehicle’s planning and its
predictions of other drivers’ behavior, and constitutes an open
problem with direct implications on the safety and viability of
autonomous driving technology. Unfortunately, dynamic games
are too computationally demanding to meet the real-time
constraints of autonomous driving in its continuous state and
action space. In this paper, we introduce a novel game-theoretic
trajectory planning algorithm for autonomous driving, that
enables real-time performance by hierarchically decomposing
the underlying dynamic game into a long-horizon “strategic”
game with simplified dynamics and full information structure,
and a short-horizon “tactical” game with full dynamics and
a simplified information structure. The value of the strategic
game is used to guide the tactical planning, implicitly extending
the planning horizon, pushing the local trajectory optimization
closer to global solutions, and, most importantly, quantitatively
accounting for the autonomous vehicle and the human driver’s
ability and incentives to influence each other. In addition, our
approach admits non-deterministic models of human decision-
making, rather than relying on perfectly rational predictions.
Our results showcase richer, safer, and more effective au-
tonomous behavior in comparison to existing techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are driving your car on the highway and,
just as you are about to pass a large truck on the other
lane, you spot another car quickly approaching in the wing
mirror. Your driver’s gut immediately gets the picture: the
other driver is trying to squeeze past and cut in front of you
at the very last second, barely missing the truck. Your mind
races forward to produce an alarming conclusion: it is too
tight—yet the other driver seems determined to attempt the
risky maneuver anyway. If you brake immediately, you could
give the other car enough room to complete the maneuver
without risking an accident; if you accelerate, you might
close the gap fast enough to dissuade the other driver at the
last second.
Driving is fundamentally a game-theoretic problem, and
safety depends on getting the solution right. However, most
approaches in the literature follow a “pipeline” approach
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4D Overtaking
Fig. 1: Demonstration of our hierarchical game-theoretic planning frame-
work on a simulated overtaking scenario. The autonomous vehicle (yellow)
is initially driving faster than the human-driven car (white). The heatmap
displays the hierarchical planner’s strategic value, ranging from red (low
value) to blue (high value), which accounts for the outcome of possible
interactions between the two vehicles. (a) As the autonomous vehicle
approaches, it is incentivized to pressure the human to change lanes and let
it pass (note the growth of a high-value region directly behind the human in
the left lane). (b) If the human does not maneuver, the autonomous vehicle
chooses to change lanes and overtake, following the higher values in the
right lane.
that generates predictions of the trajectories of human-driven
vehicles and then feeds them to the planning module as
unalterable moving obstacles [1–4]. This can lead to both ex-
cessively conservative and in some cases unsafe behavior [5],
a well-studied issue in the robotic navigation literature known
as the “frozen robot” phenomenon [6].
Recent work has addressed this by modeling human
drivers as utility-driven agents who will plan their trajectory
in response to the autonomous vehicle’s internal plan. The
autonomous vehicle can then select a plan that will elicit the
best human trajectory in response [7, 8]. Unfortunately, this
treats the human as a pure follower in the game-theoretic
sense, effectively inverting the roles in previous approaches.
That is, the human is assumed to take the autonomous
vehicle’s future trajectory as immutable and plan her own
fully accommodating to it, rather than try to influence it.
Further, the human driver must be able to observe, or exactly
predict, the future trajectory planned by the autonomous
vehicle, which is hardly realistic for anything other than very
short planning horizons. As we will discuss in our results,
this can lead to undesirably aggressive vehicle behavior.
In this work, we introduce a hierarchical game-theoretic
framework to address the mutual influence between the
human and the autonomous vehicle while maintaining com-
putational tractability. Our framework hinges on the use of
a coupled interaction model in order to plan for horizons
of multiple seconds, during which drivers can affect each
other’s behavior through their actions over time. We do
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this by computing the optimal value and strategies for a
dynamic nonzero-sum game with a long horizon (typically
a few seconds) and a full closed-loop feedback informa-
tion structure [9, 10]. In order to maintain tractability, we
propose solving this long-horizon game using simplified
dynamics, which will approximately capture the vehicles’
ability to execute different trajectories. The resulting long-
term value, which captures the expected outcome of the
strategic interaction from every state, can then be used as
an informative terminal component in the objective function
used in a receding-horizon planning and control scheme. This
low-level planner can use a higher-fidelity representation of
the dynamics, while only planning for a shorter time horizon
(typically less than one second) during which simplifications
in the interaction have a less critical effect [11–13].
Our framework therefore hierarchically combines:
• A strategic (high-level) planner that determines the
outcome of long-term interactions using simplified dy-
namics and fully coupled interaction.
• A tactical (low-level) planner that computes short-term
vehicle trajectories using high-fidelity dynamics and
simplified interaction, informed by the long-term value
computed by the strategic planner.
By more accurately capturing the information structure in
the interaction between the autonomous vehicle and other
drivers and using a more tractable dynamical model, the hi-
erarchical framework makes it possible to reason farther into
the future than most receding-horizon trajectory planners.
The high-level game value informs the trajectory optimiza-
tion as a terminal cost, implicitly giving it an approximate
insight into the longer time scale (in a similar spirit to a
variety of planning schemes, e.g. [14]). In addition, since this
strategic value is computed globally via dynamic program-
ming, it can help mitigate the local nature of most trajectory
optimization schemes, biasing them towards better solutions.
An important strength of our framework is that the strate-
gic planner does not require using a deterministic model of
the human, such as an ideal rational agent, but instead allows
a variety of models including probabilistic models such as
noisy rationality, commonly used in inverse optimal control
(also inverse reinforcement learning) [15, 16]. In addition,
the framework is agnostic to the concrete planner used at
the tactical level: while we demonstrate our approach with
an optimizer based on [7], this could be replaced with other
methods, including deep closed-loop prediction models, such
as [17], by introducing the strategic value as a terminal
cost term in their objective function. Therefore, the method
proposed here should not be seen as competing with such
planning schemes, but rather as enhancing them.
Importantly, solving the underlying dynamic game does
not imply that the autonomous vehicle will be more
aggressive—its driving behavior will ultimately depend on
the optimization objective specified by the system designer,
which may include terms encoding comfort and safety of
other road users. With adequate objective design, our frame-
work can enable safer and more efficient autonomous driving
by planning with a more accurate model of interactions.
II. DYNAMIC GAME FORMULATION
We consider a single1 human driver H and a single
autonomous system A in control of their respective vehicles.
The dynamics of the joint state xt ∈ X ⊂ Rn of the vehicles
in the world, which we assume to be fully observable, are
xt+1 = f(xt, utA, u
t
H) , (1)
where uti ∈ Ui ⊂ Rmi is the driving control action for each
i ∈ {A,H} at time step t; we assume Ui is compact.
The autonomous system is attempting to maximize an
objective that depends on the evolution of the two vehicles
over some finite time horizon, namely a cumulative return:
RA(x
0:N , u0:NA , u
0:N
H ) =
N∑
t=0
rA(x
t, utA, u
t
H) . (2)
The reward function rA captures the designer’s specifications
of the vehicle’s behavior and may encode aspects like fuel
consumption, passenger comfort, courteousness, time effi-
ciency, and safety . Some of these aspects (crucially safety)
may depend on the joint state of the two vehicles; the reward
function may also explicitly depend on the human driver’s
actions (the designer may, for instance, decide to penalize
it for causing other vehicles to maneuver abruptly). The
autonomous vehicle therefore needs to reason about not only
its own future actions, but also those of the human driver.
We assume that the autonomous vehicle has some pre-
dictive model of the human’s actions as a function of the
currently available information (the joint state, and possibly
the autonomous vehicle’s current action). The coupling in the
planning problem is then explicit. If the system models the
human as exactly or approximately attempting to maximize
her own objective function, the coupling takes the form of
a dynamic game, in which each player acts strategically as
per her own objective function accounting for the other’s
possible actions. Since both players observe the current state
at each time, this dynamic game has closed-loop feedback
information structure, and optimal values and strategies can
be computed using dynamic programming [9, 19].
Unfortunately, deriving these strategies can be computa-
tionally prohibitive due to the exponential scaling of com-
putation with the dimensionality of the joint state space
(which will be high for the dynamical models used in
vehicle trajectory planning). However, we argue that suc-
cessfully reasoning about traffic interactions over a horizon
of a few seconds does not require a full-fidelity model of
vehicle dynamics, and that highly informative insights can be
tractably obtained through approximate models. We further
argue that it is both useful and reasonable to model human
drivers as similarly reasoning about vehicle interactions over
the next few seconds without needing to account for fully
detailed dynamics. This insight is at the core of our solution
approach.
1While extension of our formulation and solution to N players is well-
defined (and relatively straightforward) in theory, in practice computing
the solutions requires exponential computation in the number of vehicles
involved. We thus limit the scope of this work to pairwise interactions, and
note that recent prediction approaches [18] may enable viable extensions.
III. HIERARCHICAL GAME-THEORETIC PLANNING
We propose a hierarchical decomposition of the interaction
between the autonomous vehicle and the human driver. At the
high level, we solve a dynamic game representing the long-
horizon interaction between the two vehicles through ap-
proximate dynamics. At the low level, we use the computed
value function as an approximation of the best long-horizon
outcome achievable by the autonomous vehicle from each
state, and incorporate it in the form of a guiding terminal
term in the short-horizon trajectory optimization, which is
solved in a receding-horizon fashion with a high-fidelity
model of the vehicles’ dynamics.
A. Strategic planner: Closed-loop dynamic game
Let the approximate dynamics be given by
sk+1 = φ(sk, akA, a
k
H) , (3)
where st ∈ S ⊂ Rn˜ and ati ∈ Ai ⊂ Rm˜i are the state
and action in the simplified dynamics φ. The index k is
associated to a discrete time step that may be equal to the
low-level time step or possibly different (typically coarser).
We generically assume that there exists a function g : X → S
assigning a simplified state s ∈ S to every full state x ∈
X ⊂ Rn. The approximation is usually made seeking n˜ < n
to improve tractability. This can typically be achieved by
ignoring dynamic modes in fi with comparatively small time
constants. For example, we may assume that vehicles can
achieve any lateral velocity within a bounded range in one
time step, and treat it as an input instead of a state.
We model the dynamic game under feedback closed-loop
information (both players’ actions can depend on the current
state s but not on the state history), allowing the human
driver to condition her choice of akH on the autonomous
vehicle’s current action akA at every time step k, resulting
in a Stackelberg (or leader-follower) dynamic game [19].
We need not assume that the human is an ideal rational
player, but can instead allow her action to be drawn from a
probability distribution. This is amenable to the use of human
models learned through inverse optimal control methods [15,
20], and can also be used to naturally account for modeling
inaccuracies, to the extent that the human driver’s behavior
will inevitably depart from the modeling assumptions [18].
We generalize the well-defined feedback Stackelberg dy-
namic programming solution [9] to the case in which one of
the players, in this case the follower, has a noisy decision
rule: p(akH |sk, akA). The autonomous vehicle, here in the
role of the leader, faces at each time step k the nested
optimization problem of selecting the action with the highest
Q value, which depends on the human’s decision rule p, in
turn affected by the human’s own Q values:
max
akA
QkA(s
k, akA) (4a)
s.t. p(akH | sk, akA) = piH
[
QkH(s
k, akA, ·)
]
(akH) (4b)
where QkA and Q
k
H are the state-action value functions at
time step k, and piH : L∞ → ∆(AH) maps every utility
function q : AH → R to a probability distribution over AH .
Algorithm 1: Feedback Stackelberg Dynamic Program
Data: rˆA(sˆ, aˆA, aˆH), rˆH(sˆ, aˆA, aˆH)
Result: VˆA(sˆ, k), VˆH(sˆ, k), aˆ∗A(sˆ, k), aˆ∗H(sˆ, k)
Initialization
for sˆ ∈ Sˆ do
A0 VˆA(sˆ, K + 1)← 0;
H0 VˆH(sˆ, K + 1)← 0;
Backward recursion
for k ← K to 0 do
for sˆ ∈ Sˆ do
for aˆA ∈ AˆA do
for aˆH ∈ AˆH do
H1 qH(aˆH)← rˆH(sˆ, aˆA, aˆH)
+ VˆH(φ(sˆ, aˆA, aˆH), k + 1);
H2 P (aˆH | aˆA)← piH [qH ](aˆH);
H3 q∗H(aˆA)←
∑
aˆH
P (aˆH | aˆA)× qH(aˆH);
A1 qA(aˆA)←
∑
aˆH
P (aˆH | aˆA)×(
rˆA(sˆ, aˆA, aˆ
∗
H(aˆA))
+ VˆA(φ(sˆ, aˆA, a
∗
H(aˆA)), k + 1)
)
;
A2 aˆ∗A(sˆ, k)← arg maxaˆA qA(aˆA);
A3 VˆA(sˆ, k)← qA(aˆ∗A(sˆ, k));
H4 aˆ∗H(sˆ, k)← a∗H(aˆ∗A(sˆ, k));
H5 VˆH(sˆ, k)← q∗H(aˆ∗A(sˆ, k));
A common example of piH (which we use in Section IV) is
a noisy rational Boltzmann policy, for which:
P (aH | s, aA) ∝ eQH(s,aA,aH) . (5)
The values QkA and Q
k
H are recursively obtained in back-
ward time through successive application of the dynamic
programming equations for k = K,K − 1, . . . , 0:
pi∗A(s) := arg max
a
Qk+1A (s, a) , ∀s ∈ S (6a)
aiH ∼ piH
[
QiH(s
i, aiA, ·)
]
, i ∈ {k, k + 1} (6b)
QkH(s
k, akA, a
k
H) = r˜H(s
k, akA, a
k
H)+
Eak+1H Q
k+1
H (s
k+1, pi∗A(s
k+1), ak+1H ) (6c)
QkA(s
k, akA) = EakH r˜A(s
k, akA, a
k
H)+Q
k+1
A (s
k+1, pi∗A(s
k+1))
(6d)
with sk+1 from (3) and letting QK+1A ≡ 0, QK+1H ≡ 0.
The solution approach is presented in Algorithm 1 for
a discretized state and action grid Sˆ × AˆA × AˆH . This
computation is typically intensive, with complexity O
(|Sˆ| ·
|AˆA| · |AˆH | ·K
)
, but is also extremely parallelizable, since
each grid element is independent of the rest and the entire
grid can be updated simultaneously, in theory permitting a
time complexity of O(K). Although we precomputed the
game-theoretic solution, our proposed computational method
for the strategic planner can directly benefit from the ongoing
advances in computer hardware for autonomous driving [21],
so we expect that it will be feasible to compute the strategic
value in an online setting.
Once the solution to the game has been computed, rather
than attempting to execute any of the actions in this sim-
plified dynamic representation, the autonomous vehicle can
use the resulting value V (s) := maxaQ0(s, a) as a guiding
terminal reward term for the short-horizon trajectory planner.
B. Tactical planner: Open-loop trajectory optimization
In this section we demonstrate how to incorporate the
strategic value into a low-level trajectory planner. We assume
that the planner is performing a receding-horizon trajectory
optimization scheme, as is commonly the case in state-of-the-
art methods [22]. These methods tend to plan over relatively
short time horizons (on the order of 1 s), continually gen-
erating updated “open-loop” plans from the current state—
in most cases the optimization is local, and simplifying
assumptions regarding the interaction are made in the interest
of real-time computability.
While, arguably, strategic interactions can be expected
to have a smaller effect over very short time-scales, the
vehicle’s planning should be geared towards efficiency and
safety beyond the reach of a single planning window. The
purpose of incorporating the computed strategic value is
to guide the trajectory planner towards states from which
desirable long-term performance can be achieved.
We therefore formalize the tactical trajectory planning
problem as an optimization with an analogous objective
to (2) with a shorter horizon M << N and instead introduce
the strategic value as a terminal term representing an estimate
of the optimal reward-to-go between t = M and t = N :
RA(x
0:M , u0:MA , u
0:M
H ) =
M∑
t=0
rA(x
t, utA, u
t
H)+VA
(
g(xt)
)
.
(7)
The only modification with respect to a standard receding-
horizon trajectory optimization scheme is the addition of the
strategic value term. Using the numerical grid computation
presented in Section III-A, this can be implemented as an
efficient look-up table, allowing fast access to values and
gradients (numerically approximated directly from the grid).
The low-level optimization of (7) can thus be performed
online by a trajectory optimization engine, based on some
short-term predictive model of human decisions conditioned
on the state and actions of the autonomous vehicle. In
our results we implement trajectory optimization similar
to [7] through a quasi-Newton scheme [23], in which the
autonomous vehicle iteratively solves a nested optimization
problem by estimating the human’s best trajectory response
to each candidate plan for the next M steps. We assume that
the human has an analogous objective to the autonomous
system, and can also estimate her strategic long-term value.
We stress, however, that our framework is more general,
and in essence agnostic to the concrete low-level trajectory
optimizer used, and other options are possible (e.g. [17, 18]).
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we analyze the benefit of solving the dy-
namic game by comparing our hierarchical approach to using
a tactical planner only, as in the state of the art [7, 17]. We
then study what specific aspects of the hierarchical method
lead to better performance, showcasing the importance of
reasoning with the fully coupled information structure of the
dynamic game.
A. Implementation Details
1) Environment: We use a simulated two-lane highway
environment with an autonomous car and human-driven
vehicle. Both vehicles’ rewards encode safety and efficiency
(or progress) features, along with a preference for the left
lane. For the purposes of these case studies, the autonomous
car’s reward also includes a target speed slightly faster than
the human’s and a preference for being ahead of the human.
2) Tactical-Level Dynamics.: The dynamics of each ve-
hicle are given by a dynamic bicycle model with a discrete
time step ∆t = 0.1 s. The planner uses M = 5 time steps.
3) Strategic-Level Dynamics: The joint human-
autonomous state space is 8-dimensional, making dynamic
programming challenging. Our strategic level simplifies
the state and dynamics using an approximate, high-
level representation. We consider a larger time step of
∆k = 0.5 s and a horizon K = 10 corresponding to 5 s.
Since the environment is a straight highway, we consider
only the longitudinal position of the two vehicles relative
to each other: xrel = xA − xH. We additionally assume
the human-driven vehicle’s average velocity is close to the
nominal highway speed 30 m/s, and the vehicles’ headings
are approximately aligned with the road at all times.
Finally, given the large longitudinal velocity compared
to any expected lateral velocity, we assume that vehicles
can achieve any desired lateral velocity (constrained to a
maximum absolute value of 2.5 m/s2) within one time step
(which is consistent with a typical 1.5 s lane change).
To assess the effects of different degrees of simplification
in the dynamics, we consider two different high-level models:
Constant human lateral position. Assuming the human
remains in the left lane, the high-level state becomes
[xrel, yA, vrel] and the approximate dynamics are given by
[x˙rel, y˙A, v˙rel] = [vrel, wA, aA − aH − α˜ · vrel] , (8)
with the control inputs being the autonomous car’s lateral ve-
locity wA and the vehicles’ accelerations aA, aH , and where
α˜ is the friction parameter. This allows us to implement Al-
gorithm 1 on a 101× 17× 43 grid and compute the feedback
Stackelberg solution of the high-level strategic game.
Dynamic human lateral position. Removing the assumption
that the human remains in the left lane, the augmented state
becomes [xrel, yA, yH , vrel] and the approximate dynamics are
[x˙rel, y˙A, y˙H , v˙rel] = [vrel, wA, wH , aA−aH− α˜ ·vrel] . (9)
We can then compute the feedback Stackelberg solution on
a 75× 12× 12× 21 grid using Algorithm 1.
4) Human simulation.: For consistency across our case
studies, we simulated the human driver’s behavior. We found
that for the simple maneuvers considered, a simple low-level
trajectory optimizer model produced sufficiently realistic
driving behavior. We assume that the human driver makes
accurate predictions of the autonomous vehicle’s imminent
state trajectory for the next 0.5 s.
B. Main Case Studies
The main case studies compare the tactical short-horizon,
hierarchical with constant human lateral position, and hierar-
chical with dynamic human lateral position planning methods
for 3 different driving scenarios. For each scenario, we define
a successful maneuver as the autonomous car overtaking and
merging in front of the human-driven car.
We choose not to include the local human response esti-
mate proposed in [7] into the autonomous vehicle’s tactical
plan computation, captured through the second term in the
“total derivative”
dRA
duA
=
∂RA
∂uA
+
∂RA
∂uH
∂u∗H
∂uA
. (10)
Instead, we assume, at each gradient step that ∂u
∗
H
∂uA
' 0
and allow the optimization to proceed by iterated local best
response (or iterated gradient play) between candidate plans
and predicted human trajectories. This assumption makes the
reward computationally easier to optimize and empirically
causes the autonomous car to behave less aggressively. We
address this observation in further detail in Section IV-C.2.
1) Easy Merge: We first study a typical merge maneuver
where the autonomous vehicle is ahead of the human in the
right lane. The tactical planner causes the autonomous car to
slowly merge in front of the human, while both hierarchical
planners result in the car quickly merging in front of the
human, thus receiving the larger left lane reward sooner.
2) Hard Merge: Next, we study a more difficult merge
maneuver in which the autonomous car starts behind the
human in the right lane, depicted in Fig. 2. The tactical
autonomous car overtakes the human but does not merge
into the left lane. In contrast, both hierarchical autonomous
cars overtake and merge in front of the human.
3) Overtaking: Finally, we study a complete overtaking
maneuver in which the autonomous car starts behind the
human in the same lane. The tactical autonomous car does
not successfully complete the maneuver—it first accelerates
but then brakes to remain behind the human. However, the
hierarchical autonomous car with constant human lateral
position successfully merges into the right lane, accelerates
to overtake the human (reaching a maximum speed of
39.94 m/s, which is 4.94 m/s above its target speed), and
merges back into the left lane, as shown in Fig. 3. The
hierarchical planner with dynamic human lateral position
uses a more expressive high-level abstraction, which allows
it to consider two alternative strategies, which are shown in
Fig. 1. The autonomous vehicle first approaches the human
from behind, expecting her to have an incentive (based on her
strategic value) to change lanes and let it pass. If this initial
Hard merging
(a) Low-level planner (b) Hierarchical planner 
with constant human 
lateral position
(c) Hierarchical planner 
with dynamic human 
lateral position
Fig. 2: Comparison of the planners for the hard merging scenario. The
low-level trajectory planner (a) overtakes but does not merge into the left
lane, while the game-theoretic hierarchical planners (b) and (c) successfully
merge in front of the human.
“tailgating” strategy is successful and the human changes
lane, the autonomous vehicle overtakes from the left lane.
Conversely, if the human does not begin a lane change, the
autonomous vehicle is in turn incentivized to execute the
same “lane-change” strategy exhibited by the hierarchical
planner with constant human lateral position.
3D ov rtaking
(a) Low-level planner (b) Hierarchical planner with 
constant human lateral position
Fig. 3: Demonstration of the tactical and hierarchical planners for the hard
merging scenario. The low-level trajectory planner (a) accelerates, but then
brakes and remains behind the human. On the other hand, the increasing
strategic value in the right lane incentivizes the hierarchical car (b) to change
lanes, allowing it to overtake and merge in front of the human.
C. In-depth Analysis
We observe better results from hierarchical game-theoretic
planning; we now seek to investigate why. Is the strategic
value merely lengthening the implicit horizon, helping escape
local or myopic optima, or is the difference in information
structure important? We find evidence for the latter below.
1) Hierarchical vs. long-horizon and more global tactical
planning: The hierarchical planning method provides the
autonomous car with more information about the future via
the strategic value of the long-term game, which guides the
optimization to escape local optima. If those were the only
benefits, extending the horizon of the tactical planner and re-
initializing in different basins of attraction ought to perform
similarly. We thus extend the horizon to 2 s (20 time steps)
and perform multiple independent optimizations initialized
from diverse trajectories for each car: full-left steer, full-right
steer, and straight steer (with acceleration input to maintain
speed). This stronger tactical planner is unable to optimize
in real time, unlike our other demonstrations, but is a good
tool for analysis; extension beyond 2 s was not tractable.
We tested this planner in the overtaking scenario alongside
a human-driven car that is aware of the autonomous car’s
plan, which is this planner’s assumed information structure.
The planner still fails to complete the maneuver regardless
of the initialization scheme and whether the influence term
in [7] is used, resulting in the autonomous car remaining
behind the human, as shown in Fig. 4. Moreover, we tested
this planner against a human driver who maintains a constant
slow speed of 24 m/s. In this case, the autonomous car brakes
abruptly to avoid a collision and remains behind the human,
at each time step expecting her to maximally accelerate for
the next 1 s. Despite the longer horizon and more global
optimization, this new tactical planner still assumes the
wrong information structure, i.e. that the human knows the
autonomous car’s trajectory multiple seconds into the future.
This causes poor performance when the human does not in
fact adapt to the autonomous vehicle’s plan ahead of time.
2) Differentiating through human response: When op-
timizing the autonomous car’s trajectory at the tactical
level, we computed a local equilibrium in trajectory space
using iterated local best response. We did not execute
the implicit differentiation proposed in [7], by which the
autonomous planner estimates the influence of each local
trajectory change on the optimal response of the human. We
observed that incorporating this influence term resulted in
more aggressive behavior in certain situations. In the hard
merge scenario, both hierarchical cars (with constant and
dynamic human lateral position) attempted to merge into the
left lane before having overtaken the human, resulting in a
collision, as shown in Fig. 4. In the overtaking scenario,
the hierarchical car with constant human lateral position
exhibited the same aggressive behavior.
The above results seem to confirm that modeling the hu-
man driver as a “pure” follower adapting to the autonomous
vehicle’s planned trajectory in an open-loop fashion, as for-
Tactical long LSR maintain speed  
without Hessian far overtaking
(a) Long-horizon low-level 
planner
(b) Hierarchical planner with 
constant human lateral position
3D Overtaking with Hessian
Fig. 4: Demonstration of the tactical and hierarchical planners for the hard
merging scenario. (a) In the overtaking scenario, the long-horizon and more
global tactical car accelerates, expecting the human to accommodate its
higher speed to avoid a collision. This forces the human to accelerate, and
the autonomous car remains behind the human. (b) Using the influence term
in the low-level trajectory optimization causes the hierarchical car to drive
aggressively in the hard merging scenario, resulting in a collision.
mulated in [7], may lead to undesirably aggressive behavior.
Assuming that the human driver can accurately anticipate the
autonomous car’s planned trajectory can lead the autonomous
vehicle to over-confidently execute actions that may lead
to unsafe situations when the actual human driver fails to
preemptively make way for it.
In other situations, including the influence term had no
effect on the autonomous vehicle’s behavior. In view of the
above, and given that computing this term is substantially
more expensive, we find that omitting it is a better choice
for these driving scenarios.
3) Confidence in Strategic Human Model: In this section,
we study the effects of varying the autonomous planner’s
confidence in its high-level model of the human. By model-
ing the human as a Boltzmann noisily rational agent, we can
naturally incorporate the autonomous planner’s confidence
in the human model via the inverse temperature parameter,
as in [18]. We can then compute different strategic values
corresponding to varying levels of confidence in the human
model. In the overtaking scenario, we observed that using a
strategic value with 1 as the inverse temperature parameter
(as in the previous case studies) caused the autonomous car to
successfully overtake the human, while inverse temperature
values less than 0.3 result in the autonomous car remaining
behind the human car. A lower level of confidence in the
human model discourages the autonomous car from over-
taking because the human driver is more likely to act in an
unpredictable manner that risks a collision.
V. DISCUSSION
We have introduced a hierarchical trajectory planning
formulation for an autonomous vehicle interacting with a
human-driven vehicle on the road. To tractably reason about
the mutual influence between the human and the autonomous
system, our framework uses a lower-order approximate dy-
namical model solve a nonzero sum game with closed-loop
feedback information. The value of this game is then used
to inform the planning and predictions of the autonomous
vehicle’s low-level trajectory planner.
Even with a simplified dynamical model, solving the
dynamic game will generally be computationally intensive.
We note, however, that our high-level computation presents
two key favorable characteristics for online usability. First,
it is “massively parallel” in the sense that all states on
the discretized grid may be updated simultaneously. The
need for reliable real-time perception in autonomous driving
has spurred the development of high-performance parallel
computing hardware, which will directly benefit our method.
Second, once computed, the strategic value can be readily
stored as a look-up table, enabling fast access by the low-
level trajectory planner. Of course, strategic values would
need to be pre-computed for a number of scenarios that
autonomous vehicles might encounter.
We believe that our new framework can work in con-
junction with and significantly enhance existing autonomous
driving planners, allowing autonomous vehicles to more
safely and efficiently interact with human drivers.
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